Bourdieu has additional interesting specifics about the evolution of fields over time; at least to some degree he addresses _both_ the structure of competition _within_ a field, _and_ the evolution of field boundaries / what happens _outside_ of a field.
> A field is constituted by the relational differences in position of social agents, and the boundaries of a field are demarcated by where its effects end.
(Specifically for example, where the efficacy of capital/cultural capital/symbolic capital ends, e.g. where a piece of capital like an _educational credential_ stops having _social relevance_ (e.g. qualification for a public office). The educational credential has capital value in some social domains, but not political domains, presently--capital value as defined by _whether social agents treat the given thing as valuable_.)
So w.r.t. to "hysteresis," I think some of what's pointed at here is the structure of competition within the political field (i.e concretely, who politically wins and loses) is decoupling from the "field of cultural production," e.g. the domain of what was previously the cultural/symbolic/educational "elite"; presumably pretty literally in a populist political moment (as opposed to a cultural elite political moment) the fields are by construction disjoint/orthogonal.
Part of Bourdieu's key insight (I think) is to abstract away the specific concrete things that are currently valued/valuable/efficacious, and look at the deeper structure of people competing with each other via the acquisition of valuable/efficacious things, whatever they happen to be at the current moment. Political actors that intend to stay "live" by construction have to pursue the things that are valuable for [getting votes, etc.] as their field-based success criteria.
In terms of the effects on the symbolic / cultural production class, I think the question is who will remain for what field-based rewards, when the classic types of rewards (money, power, esteem) have moved on to other more accessible pastures (political "tabloids," and TikTok hottubs?). Conceptually seriously speaking, the field of (mass) cultural production and consumption is theoretically defined by these social value effects of "where the money goes," "where the eyeballs go," "where the likes go," and what people do to get them.
Thanks for looking into / writing about Bourdieu. Random thought is that likely a bunch of his books have not actually been put onto the web and therefore not sucked into the LLM. But they are still bangers.
Well done.
Bourdieu has additional interesting specifics about the evolution of fields over time; at least to some degree he addresses _both_ the structure of competition _within_ a field, _and_ the evolution of field boundaries / what happens _outside_ of a field.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Field_theory_(sociology)#Social_system
> A field is constituted by the relational differences in position of social agents, and the boundaries of a field are demarcated by where its effects end.
(Specifically for example, where the efficacy of capital/cultural capital/symbolic capital ends, e.g. where a piece of capital like an _educational credential_ stops having _social relevance_ (e.g. qualification for a public office). The educational credential has capital value in some social domains, but not political domains, presently--capital value as defined by _whether social agents treat the given thing as valuable_.)
So w.r.t. to "hysteresis," I think some of what's pointed at here is the structure of competition within the political field (i.e concretely, who politically wins and loses) is decoupling from the "field of cultural production," e.g. the domain of what was previously the cultural/symbolic/educational "elite"; presumably pretty literally in a populist political moment (as opposed to a cultural elite political moment) the fields are by construction disjoint/orthogonal.
Part of Bourdieu's key insight (I think) is to abstract away the specific concrete things that are currently valued/valuable/efficacious, and look at the deeper structure of people competing with each other via the acquisition of valuable/efficacious things, whatever they happen to be at the current moment. Political actors that intend to stay "live" by construction have to pursue the things that are valuable for [getting votes, etc.] as their field-based success criteria.
In terms of the effects on the symbolic / cultural production class, I think the question is who will remain for what field-based rewards, when the classic types of rewards (money, power, esteem) have moved on to other more accessible pastures (political "tabloids," and TikTok hottubs?). Conceptually seriously speaking, the field of (mass) cultural production and consumption is theoretically defined by these social value effects of "where the money goes," "where the eyeballs go," "where the likes go," and what people do to get them.
Thanks for looking into / writing about Bourdieu. Random thought is that likely a bunch of his books have not actually been put onto the web and therefore not sucked into the LLM. But they are still bangers.